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Abstract: Know-wh (knowing what, where etc) ascriptions are ubiquitous in many 
languages. One standard analysis of know-wh is this: someone knows-wh just in case she 
knows that p, where p is an answer to the question included in the wh-clause. Additional 
conditions have also been proposed, but virtually all analyses assume that propositional 
knowledge of an answer is at least a necessary condition for knowledge-wh (even if it is not 
sufficient). This paper challenges this assumption, by arguing that there are cases where we 
have knowledge-wh without knowledge-that of an answer, for example in the cases familiar 
from arguments for the Extended Mind hypothesis.  
1. Varieties of knowledge  : know-that, know-how, know-wh
Many introductions to epistemology start with noting the different constructions we use when we 
talk about knowledge. It is often thought that, at least prima facie, the different constructions 
attribute different kinds of knowledge. Usually two or three such types are mentioned: “know that” 
constructions, expressing knowledge of facts; “know how” constructions, which usually concern 
some practical matter of performing certain kinds of actions or attaining certain kinds of goals; and 
occasionally a third one, “know someone or something”, expressing knowledge by acquaintance. 
Both the initial characterisation and the ultimate classification of these categories are subject to 
much controversy, but this isn't the topic of this paper. Rather, I would like to deal with a fourth 
kind of construction, which, though ubiquitous, is less often mentioned separately or analysed in 
detail: so-called “know-wh” constructions, where the verb “know” is followed by an interrogative 
clause, as for example someone knowing when, or where, or why something happened. 
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in know-wh attributions, partly in 
connection to two debates: an argument for the reducibility of know-how to know-that, and the 
proposal that knowledge is contrast-relative. I briefly summarise these two issues in this section and
the next, and identify an assumption shared among all parties to each debate: namely, that some sort
of know-that is necessary for know-wh. The aim of this paper is to argue against this assumption.
One of the issues which brought know-wh into the focus of attention was an influential 
argument for the reducibility of “know-how” knowledge to propositional knowledge (Stanley and 
Williamson 2001). The argument proceeds through the following steps:
(KH1) Know-how is a species of know-wh
(KH2) Know-wh reduces to know-that
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(KH3) Therefore know-how reduces to know-that
(KH2), the claim that know-wh reduces to know-that, is based on some version of the following 
plausible proposal: knowing-wh is a matter of knowing a proposition that answers the question 
included in the wh-clause. For example, Ivan knows who founded Saint Petersburg just in case Ivan 
knows that Peter the Great founded Saint Petersburg, and this is a correct answer to the question of 
who founded Saint Petersburg. More schematically:
(Reductionist) S knows-wh iff (there is a p such that) p is a correct answer to the question 
contained in the interrogative wh-clause, and S knows that p
If the above analysis is correct, then knowledge-wh reduces to knowledge-that in a straightforward 
way: knowing certain propositions, which happen to be answers to various questions, is both 
necessary and sufficient for the appropriate knowledge-wh. 
The simple reductionist analysis has been criticised on the grounds that simply knowing a 
proposition that constitutes a proper answer is not always sufficient for knowledge-wh. One 
suggestion was that in addition to an answer being known, it also has to be known as an answer to 
that particular question. That is, the knowing subject somehow has to be aware of the specific 
question asked, and that the proposition known constitutes an answer to that question. 
It should be noted that although this move somewhat complicates the reduction of know-wh 
to know-that, it's unclear whether it seriously undermines the argument for the reducibility of know-
how to know-that in the above argument consisting of (KH1) – (KH3). Some of those who think 
that knowledge-how is genuinely different from knowledge-that emphasise the practical, 
procedural, ability-related nature of knowledge-how, as opposed to the theoretical, factual nature of 
know-that. Others argued that know-how is special because it is less susceptible to epistemic luck 
than knowledge-how (Carter and Pritchard 2013). Neither proposal seems to gain much support 
from a more complex analysis of know-wh. Even if a proposition has to be known as an answer to a
question in order to qualify as know-wh, this doesn't seem to create a character that would support a
sui generis knowledge-how, either in making it related to abilities, or making it less susceptible to 
epistemic luck. A more promising strategy to question the so-called “intellectualist” position 
expressed in (KH3) may therefore be to object to (KH1), that is, object to the claim that know-how 
is a species of know-wh. In fact, there is some reason to believe that (KH1) is not right, given that 
in many languages other than English, some of the paradigmatic cases of knowledge-how are 
expressed by a formula that is clearly quite different from know-wh constructions (see Rumfitt 
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2003; for a response by a defender of the intellectualist position, Stanley 2010). Be that as it may, 
this debate is not the focus of the current paper.
2. Know-that as a necessary condition for know-wh
According to the standard reductionist analysis of know-wh, S knows-wh iff S knows that p, where 
p is a correct answer to the question contained in the interrogative wh-clause. Those who deny the 
correctness of the straightforward reductionist analysis are sometimes called “anti-reductionists”, 
for example by Jonathan Schaffer (Schaffer 2007) who defends such a position. As Jesper 
Kallestrup points out (Kallestrup 2009), the simple reductionist claim has two components: the first 
is that knowledge-wh is a type of knowledge-that, and the second is that knowledge-that is a binary 
relation between a subject and a proposition. Schaffer denies the second claim: he defends the view 
that knowledge-that is a tertiary relation among a subject, a proposition and a set of relevant 
contrasts. This is the second debate I alluded to above which put knowledge-wh in the focus of 
interest. Note that although Schaffer denies the above simple reductionist claim, once we recognise 
that ordinary propositional knowledge involves a relation to something other than the subject and a 
proposition, it is possible to give an account of knowledge-wh as a type of knowledge-that. In fact, 
Schaffer's position could be characterised as a kind of reductionism too (the following are not meant
to be steps of an argument, but rather claims that a defender of contrastive knowledge would be 
committed to):
(KContrast1) Know-wh claims are question/contrast relative
(KContrast2) Know-that claims are question/contrast relative
(KContrast3) Know-wh reduces to know-that
Whether the above is a fair representation of Schaffer's position or not, one thing is clear: both 
reductionists and “anti-reductionists” in Schaffer's sense accept that knowing a relevant proposition,
one that answers the question in the wh-clause, is at least a necessary condition for knowledge-wh. 
This is true of all the accounts of knowledge-wh I am familiar with. It is true even for a 
theory that denies that knowledge-wh attributions involve reference to a known proposition. 
Meghan Masto (2010) argues for such a position. She distinguishes between what is strictly 
speaking expressed in a know-wh attribution on the one hand, and the truth-conditions of such an 
attribution on the other. She holds that knowledge-wh attributions simply express that the subject 
stands in the knowledge-relation to a question – as opposed to, for example, attributions of 
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“wonder”, which state that a subject stands to a wondering-relation to a question – without 
referencing the proposition. Nonetheless, the truth of the attribution does require the appropriate 
knowledge-that:
While the anti-reductionist is right in recognizing that knowledge of the proposition that is 
the answer to the indirect question is necessary for the knowledge-wh ascription to be true, it
is not clear why we should think that the knowledge-wh ascription references the answer or 
even quantifies over propositions that may be the answer. In other words, it is true that there
must be some proposition known for a knowledge-wh ascription to be true, but the 
knowledge-wh ascription need not express that there is a proposition that is known. (Masto 
2010, p. 398, emphasis added)
In summary, theories of knowledge tend to classify knowledge-wh as a type of knowledge-that 
(with possible additional conditions on the type of knowledge-that which qualifies for knowledge-
wh). Perhaps this explains why know-wh constructions are seldom mentioned separately or 
discussed in detail among the different constructions by which we attribute knowledge. If 
knowledge-wh is not fundamentally different from knowledge-that, then there is no need for a 
separate treatment.
In this paper, I shall argue that contrary to the received opinion, there are some cases of 
knowledge-wh where knowledge of a proposition that is most plausibly regarded as an answer to 
the question in the wh-clause is not necessary. If my cases stand, then knowledge-wh fails to reduce
to knowledge-that in a more radical sense than assumed hitherto. However, this lack of reducibility 
does not mean that all cases of irreducible knowledge-wh are fundamentally different from 
knowledge-that in the way sometimes knowledge-how is supposed to be different. Rather, as we 
shall see, some typical cases of irreducible knowledge-wh are better seen as extensions of the sort 
of factual knowledge that is usually associated with knowledge that. Propositional knowledge will 
turn out to be a specific case of this kind of factual knowledge.
I will introduce the idea in section 3 with the help of some ordinary cases where, I claim, it 
is natural to attribute knowledge-wh but not knowledge-that of the answer. Section 4 relates the 
issue of acquiring knowledge to the process of inquiry and answering questions. This leads to 
asking in section 5 why we have know-wh as well as know-that attributions. Some of the 
characteristic functions highlight the fact that when attributing knowledge-wh, we do not have to 
entertain the proposition that is the answer to the question. This, I argue, opens the possibility that 
the subject of attribution does not need to entertain the proposition – it is sufficient if she has 
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appropriate access to it. Sections 6 and 7 spell out what this “appropriate access” is, and explain that
it has a functional and an epistemic component. Section 8 asks whether the cases in section 3 satisfy
the conditions of appropriate access. Section 9 deals with the objection that the subjects in my 
examples don't have knowledge-wh, they only know how to find out the answer to a question. I 
argue that knowing how to find an answer is  a relatively weak condition which doesn't do justice to
the strong epistemic position of the protagonists of my examples. Achieving this strong epistemic 
position is a development made possible by technology, I argue in section 10.
3. Some ordinary know-wh attributions
I started with the idea that, as the first step in building a theory of knowledge, it may be worth 
looking at the various constructions we use to claim or attribute knowledge. Let me now present 
some ordinary cases where it is natural to attribute know-wh knowledge. 
A: I don't know Pierre's phone number, but you do, right?
B: I do.
A: Can you give it to me?
B: Of course (reaching for her smartphone).
(Attribution: B knows what Pierre's phone-number is.)
C: We have paid most of the money for the apartment, but there is one more installment. My
lawyer knows when this last payment is due, can you call him and ask? (The lawyer checks 
the relevant document and gives the answer.)
(Attribution: C's lawyer knows when the last payment for C's apartment is due.) 
E: Where can I find a dry cleaner in this shopping mall?
F: I don't know, but let's ask the information desk, I'm sure they do. (The person at the 
information desk checks the directory of services in the mall and gives the answer.)
(Attribution: The person at the information desk knows where one can find a dry cleaner in 
this shopping mall.)
 
Cases like this are the starting point for my proposal. What is common to these situations is this: 
knowledge-wh is attributed to various people, apparently based on their ability to answer accurately 
certain questions. However, the attributors do not assume that these people can answer the questions
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from the top of their head or know the answers by heart: B has to consult her smartphone, C's 
lawyer the relevant documents, the person at the information desk the directory of services in the 
mall. These latter circumstances may suggest that at the time of the attributions, the subjects lack 
knowledge-that.  B doesn't know that Pierre's phone-number is 123456789 when she is reaching for 
her smartphone, C's lawyer doesn't know that the last payment is due on 31 August when the above 
conversation takes place, and nor does the person at the information desk know at the time of 
attribution that there is a dry cleaner on the third floor next to the supermarket. If the attributions of 
know-wh are nonetheless correct, then we have here cases of knowledge-wh without knowledge-
that of the (contextually relevant) answer. 
This was of course very quick, so I would like to emphasise that the cases above merely 
constitute a starting point, and I do not think that the possibility of the above scenarios taking place 
is, in itself, sufficient to establish my conclusion. Nor would I want to insist at all cost that each of 
the three cases above are knowledge-wh without knowledge-that. It is possible that a further 
analysis of the general features where know-wh and know-that diverge reveals that the above cases 
are not, after all, suitable to illustrate my conclusion. Still, it's instructive to consider the apparent 
ease with which we attribute knowledge-wh in situations like the above. In the following sections, I 
will sketch a theoretical background that could serve as a basis of attributions of know-wh without 
knowledge-that.
4. Answering questions
Even if knowing how to find out answers to questions is not always sufficient for knowledge-wh, it 
is very plausible that the ability to answer questions is in an intimate relation to knowledge-wh. 
Several people linked the understanding of knowledge to understanding the process of inquiry, 
where inquiry involves – possibly among other things – formulating, asking and answering 
questions (see Lihoreau 2008 for a collection of papers on this topic). 
Suppose a question is asked in a certain context. Questions have (proper) answers, which 
may not all be correct answers, as it is illustrated in the following exchanges. In the first, the 
addressee of the question doesn't answer the question (or doesn't give a proper answer – I will use 
these expressions to mean the same), in the second, she answers the question (properly) but 
incorrectly, in the third, she answers the question both properly and correctly. 
K: What is the capital of Bolivia?
L: This morning.
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M: What are the ingredients of pesto sauce?
N:  Pesto sauce is made of cream cheese, brown sugar and a squeeze of lemon juice.
O: Who developed the first modern periodic table?
P: Mendeleev.
I will assume (though not much will turn on this) that all meaningful questions have (proper) 
answers, even if they don't always have correct answers. I will be noncommittal about the form of 
an answer – that, is, on the question of whether all answers are propositions or not, and on whether 
the above answers are elliptical for full propositions. 
What it is to answer a question or what counts as an answer to a question is a complex issue,
even without addressing the issue of knowledge. I mention but one problem about the context-
sensitivity of answering questions. Suppose we meet Gustave, a cosmopolitan world traveller on the
Trans-Siberian express, and someone asks where Gustave lives – to say he lives in Paris seems like 
a proper answer. If Gustave does live in Paris, then this is also a correct answer. However, suppose 
that we are visiting Paris and comparing living in different neighbourhoods and which of our 
acquaintances live where; replying to the question of where Gustave lives by saying that he lives in 
Paris does not seem like a proper answer (whether it's true or not). 
Since the ability to answer questions is crucial in understanding knowledge-wh, a complete 
theory of knowledge-wh will need an account of answering questions. I don't have the space to 
survey all the issues here, let alone resolve them in a satisfactory manner, and therefore I will 
assume that we have some or other theory of what counts as answering a question.  
5. Functions of know-wh attributions
I mentioned the idea that understanding knowledge is connected to understanding the process of 
inquiry, where inquiry involves formulating, asking and answering questions. There are a number of
verbs that take wh-clauses and can be used to characterise the process of enquiry: G inquires who 
left a half-eaten pastrami sandwich on the table; H is wondering what should be done with it: J asks 
whether it would be OK to throw it away. Typically, these verbs don't take that-clauses, or when 
they do, they have a somewhat different meaning. The verbs express some attitude to a question: 
usually something like the attitude of wanting to find out the answer. It is quite plausible to suggest 
that when we wonder, ask, inquire, or generally want to know the answer to a question, we have 
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some sort of implicit understanding of what would count as a proper answer to the question. 
(Though this doesn't mean grasping all the possible answers. That would seem to be far too 
difficult). 
The inquirer can be understood as trying to select the correct one(s) from the range of 
possible answers. When a question is answered, the inquirer often (or at least sometimes) adopts a 
belief in (some of) the answers to the question. The verb “belief”, as it is well-known, takes that-
clauses, and doesn't take wh-clauses (apart from the rather special “believe what” as in “I believe 
what I see”).  Some of the beliefs we adopt also qualify as knowledge, and as we may expect, 
knowledge also takes a that-clause. So we may – somewhat metaphorically – conceive the process 
of inquiry as getting from a wh-clause to a that-clause. Inquiry words that take wh-clauses throw up 
questions which have a range of possible answers, none of which is selected at that point; when a 
question is answered, we narrowed down the range to one proposition which is then expressed by a 
that-clause.
In contrast to inquiry-words that tend to take only wh-clauses, and “belief” which takes only
that-clauses, “know” takes both that-clauses and the whole range of wh-clauses.  A know-that 
ascription is suitable to characterise the state of the person who not only adopted a belief, but has 
also done it in a knowledgable way. Knowledge, in its most paradigmatic form, is a state we are in 
at the end of the inquiry, when a question is answered and a proposition (an answer) is singled out. 
One then may wonder why we have, in addition to know-that ascriptions, also know-wh ascriptions.
I do not have a complete answer to this question, but there are at least three things that we can 
achieve with know-wh ascriptions but not with know-that ascriptions. One is to characterise 
inquirers as wanting to know something, and hence linking the process of inquiry to the attainment 
of knowledge. When I want to know who developed the first periodic table, the question is still 
open, and hence I cannot single out a proposition that would be the object of my inquiry. (In this 
respect, “know-whether” is rather special among know-wh constructions, since it already settles on 
a proposition). 
A second function of know-wh attributions is to characterise a subject who keeps track, in a 
knowledgeable way, of a changing subject-matter; for example, a detective who trails a suspect for 
a day. If we had only know-that attributions, we could say that for the whole period, the detective 
knew that the suspect was within a certain area. But this doesn't do justice to the fact that she can 
locate the suspect much more precisely within that area. Alternatively, we could use a different 
attribution every minute: at 12:01, the detective knows that the suspect is entering the cafe, at 12:02,
she knows that the suspect is standing in the queue for coffee, and so on. This can be sidestepped by
a know-wh attribution, because it does not require specifying the proposition: so we can say that for
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a period of time, the detective knew exactly where the suspect was.
A third advantage of know-wh ascriptions is that we can attribute knowledge to people even 
if we ourselves are ignorant of the subject matter. Edward Craig (1990) proposed that the function 
of the concept knowledge is to flag reliable informants. Whether this observation is the key to 
understanding the entire nature of knowledge is a separate question, but it is indeed very plausible 
that knowledge attributions have this function. There are different kinds of situations where 
explicitly ascribing knowledge can serve to flag someone as a reliable informant. I can use a know-
that construction to assure you that I know (as opposed to having a vague memory or merely 
guessing) that Mendeleev developed the first modern periodic table, so I can flag myself as a 
reliable informant on this particular point. 
But what happens if I am ignorant on some matter, and want to direct to you to a more 
knowledgeable person? Here know-that ascriptions are not very useful at all. Since know-that 
ascriptions are factive, by asserting that P knows that Mendeelev constructed the first periodic table,
I commit myself to the truth of the embedded proposition; moreover, if knowledge is the norm of 
assertion, then I also implicitly put forward myself as a knower. Maybe P's knowledge adds some 
assurance to mine – and the attribution could serve some quite different purposes – but when it 
comes to directing listeners to further, better sources of reliable information, know-that ascriptions 
don't really help.
In contrast, know-wh ascriptions can serve precisely this purpose. In the exchanges in 
section 2, the attributors of knowledge-wh lack the relevant propositional knowledge. C doesn't 
know that the last payment for his apartment is due on 31 August, but he is in the position to direct 
his listener to a better source of information, by stating that his lawyer knows when the payment is 
due. When making a know-wh ascription, it is not necessary that the attributor herself entertains or 
grasps the proposition (or a proposition) that answers the question included in the wh-clause.
Of course, by putting forward the attribution, the attributor claims that the subject of the 
attribution has an appropriate relationship to the answer. One way to accommodate this fact is to 
formulate the content of such ascriptions as existential statements: in saying that her accountant 
knows when the payment is due, C states that there is a p such that her accountant knows that p and 
p answers the questions of when the payment is due. This way the attributor need not herself 
represent the content of p; it is enough if she states p's existence and appropriate relationship to the 
subject. On a somewhat different variant, we state that the accountant knows of a time t, that t is the
time when the payment is due – but the attributor need not know what t is. (See Brogaard 2009; 
since this analysis also assumes that knowledge-that is necessary for know-wh, I will not treat this 
account separately).
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Others go even further. In the article quoted above, Meghan Masto argues that know-wh 
attributions don't even express that there is such a proposition: their literal content is simply that the 
subject can answer a question. Presumably, in the analysis of what it is to be able to answer a 
question, an appropriate relationship to the answers will come in; but this could be a matter of 
further analysis and not something that is literally expressed by the attributions. (I am not endorsing
this view, only mentioning it as a possible position).
Knowledge-wh attributions don't require the attributor's explicit representation of the 
content of the answer. This, I want to argue now, opens the possibility of knowledge-wh where the 
subject herself does not explicitly represent the content of the answer. Knowing that p, where p is 
the (an) answer to the question is not necessary for knowing-wh; it is sufficient if the subject has 
appropriate access to the information that p. Knowing that p (and believing that p) are special cases
of appropriate access. The following sections explain what this means. 
6. Functional features of appropriate access
I propose that it is sufficient for knowledge-wh if the subject has appropriate access to the 
information which constitutes the (or a) correct answer to the question included in the wh-clause. 
What is “appropriate access”? It has at least two components: a functional and an epistemic one. 
The functional component can be approached by recalling the so-called “extended mind” cases. In 
an influential paper published in 1998, Andy Clark and David Chalmers discussed the imaginary 
case of Otto and Inga. Inga is an ordinary person, who plans her activities and carries out her 
actions in the usual way: for example, when she wants to go to the Museum of Modern Arts, she 
recalls from memory that the Museum of Modern Art is on 53d street, and she sets off accordingly. 
Otto suffers from serious long-term memory loss, and therefore enters all important information to a
notebook that he carries with him all the time. Where Inga consults her memory, Otto consults the 
notebook. When Otto wants to go to the Museum of Modern Arts, he looks up the address in the 
notebook, and sets off towards 53d street accordingly.
If Inga can recall the whereabouts of the Museum of Modern Arts from memory, we 
normally attribute her the belief that MoMA is on 53d street even before the episode of accessing 
the information and acting upon it. Clark and Chalmers argue that we should do the same with Otto:
we should attribute him the same belief, even prior to consulting his notebook. They base this 
argument on the claim that the information in Otto's notebook plays the same functional role in 
Otto's mental life and actions as the information stored in Inga's memory.
Many people have debated this claim by Clark and Chalmers, and the matter remains 
controversial. There are at least some good reasons to resist the conclusion that Otto has beliefs 
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with contents that are the same as the information stored in his notebook. I am not going to settle 
this debate here. For I want to argue that even putting aside the issue of whether Otto has the beliefs
in question, it is plausible that we can attribute him knowledge, namely the knowledge of where 
MoMA is. He may not know that MoMA is on 53d street, but nonetheless he knows where it is.
Clark and Chalmers point out several important features in Otto's relationship to his 
notebook which Clark called “glue and trust” conditions in a later piece (Clark 2010): that Otto 
constantly relies on information in the notebook when answering questions or executing actions, the
information is readily available, and is automatically endorsed upon retrieval. A fourth condition 
was that Otto consciously endorsed all information he entered in the notebook in the past, which is 
less obviously required in all cases – I will return to this issue in section 8. In any case, something 
like the glue and trust conditions capture well what I call “functional” conditions for having 
appropriate access to a piece of information that qualifies as know-wh. In the next section, I turn to 
the epistemic conditions that have to hold in order to have a case of knowledge-wh. 
7. Positive epistemic features of entry-forming processes
Clark and Chalmers's original story does not address Otto's epistemic standing in relation to entries 
in his notebook. For all we know, Otto enters information in his notebook in a whimsical and 
careless fashion, he does not try to make sure that his information comes from a reliable source, he 
does nothing to keep entries up-to-date. If this were the case, it would be certainly wrong to say that
Otto knows where MoMA is. However, the case could also be different: managing the notebook 
gives Otto an opportunity to exhibit all sorts of epistemically positive features.
Positive epistemic features are often formulated in terms of how a subject forms and sustains
beliefs. In the current case, I want to remain neutral on the issue whether Otto has beliefs 
concerning the subject-matter of the notebook entries.1 So we will have to modify the formulation of
positive epistemic features, so that it relates not to forming and upholding beliefs, but to the 
acquisition and storage of information. In fact, this is quite straightforward in many cases. For 
example, it has been suggested that the reliability of a belief-forming process (that is, the measure 
of the proportion of true beliefs produced by a certain type of process) is a positive epistemic 
feature, one that is necessary for knowledge. Similarly, we can define reliability for an entry-
producing process as the measure of the proportion of correct entries produced by that process. This
will largely depend on Otto's practices of entering and keeping information to the notebook. Part of 
this practice involves forming judgements before an entry is made, and the reliability of this process
will be the familiar reliability of the judgement-forming process. A further aspect of the practice 
will concern keeping the entries up-to-date and consistent.
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Further examples of positive epistemic features are the “sensitivity” and “safety” of beliefs. 
A belief is sensitive if the following counterfactual statement holds: if the proposition believed 
weren't true, the subject would not believe it. It is easy to modify this for stored information: an 
entry in the notebook is sensitive just in case if the information in the entry were not correct, it 
would not be in the notebook. Whether an entry is sensitive or not largely depends on Otto's 
epistemically relevant practices. Drawing information from reliable sources, making sure that 
entries are up-to-date and coordinated with each other result in entries that track the truth. The so-
called “safety condition” for stored information can be formulated in a similar way: an entry is safe 
if the information it contains could not easily be wrong, given the way Otto handles the entries in 
the notebook.
Yet another example can be offered by drawing on Duncan Pritchard's discussion of a 
subject's epistemic situation in extended mind cases (Pritchard 2010). Pritchard works with the 
hypothesis that knowledge is true belief that is due to cognitive ability. The production of a belief is 
due to a cognitive ability if a “reliable belief-forming process is integrated within, and therefore a 
part of, the cognitive character of the agent” (Pritchard 2010, p. 136). Pritchard notes that Otto 
showed considerable epistemic virtue in the first place when he realised that his memory was failing
and decided to keep information in the notebook. And in his further engagement of the notebook, he
can integrate the production and storage of information in the notebook to his cognitive character. 
We can thus agree with Pritchard that Otto can have knowledge – even if we dispense with the idea 
that Otto had beliefs with contents stored in the notebook. (Pritchard actually engages with the Otto 
case under the description of “extended cognition”, rather than “extended mind”, so he need not be 
committed on the issue of Otto's beliefs). In any case, on this proposal, Otto has knowledge because
his cognitive success is due to his cognitive ability, since he relies on a reliable entry-forming 
process that is integrated with his cognitive character. 
Philosophers disagree about the proper analysis of knowledge – beginning with the question 
of what form the analysis should take. Some hope to give an analysis in the form of individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, others believe that we can work out separate necessary 
and sufficient conditions, yet others are sceptical about a reductionist analysis of knowledge and 
offer an illuminating account not in terms of conditions, but rather by characterising the function of 
knowledge, or the semantic behaviour of epistemic terms. I cannot settle these debates in this paper,
but the point of this section is to show that there are a number of directions we can pursue if we 
want to make sense of Otto's situation as a knower. 
I am not claiming that just about any theory of knowledge can be modified to apply to Otto's
case – some, typically those which work with an internalist conception of justification, will resist 
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such a move. If the reader is a passionate defender of one of these theories, I have little chance to 
succeed in convincing her that Otto has knowledge. So the account I am offering is based on some 
basic assumptions about knowledge, one being that an externalist analysis of knowledge or 
justification is along the right lines. But given these assumptions, we can attribute to Otto positive 
epistemic features which parallel some plausible accounts of knowledge. I myself am particularly 
sympathetic to the account defended by Pritchard, because it offers a uniform account of the 
functional and epistemic conditions for appropriate access: an entry-forming process that is both 
functionally and epistemically integrated with the cognitive character of the agent.
8  . Actual cases of know-wh without know-that
The suggestion is then the following: Otto knows where the Museum of Modern Art is, because he 
has appropriate access to the information that the Museum of Modern Art is on 53d street, and this 
is the correct answer to the question included in the wh-clause. This, in turn, means that this 
information is stored in a database on which Otto relies when answering questions or executing 
actions, the information is readily available, automatically endorsed by Otto upon retrieval, and was
entered and stored in the data-base through a reliable entry-forming process that is integrated with 
Otto's cognitive character.
Part of the extended mind debate concerns the question of how close Otto's case is to any 
real life situation. In the original debate, the issue arises for those who agree that in the imaginary 
story, Otto has the appropriate beliefs: the further question is whether there are any actual cases of 
extended minds. In this paper, I do not discuss the question of Otto's beliefs, but would like to argue
that he has knowledge-wh. And just like in the original debate, the question arises: if Otto has 
knowledge-wh, are there any real life examples that exhibit a sufficiently similar structure? For 
example, are the three cases I mentioned in section 2 sufficiently like Otto's case so that they qualify
as knowledge? 
The smart phone holder comes closest to satisfying the glue and trust conditions: we can 
assume that she carries her phone everywhere, and so whenever the issue of Pierre's phone number 
arises, she will have access to the information. The few occasions where her phone's battery dies or 
she leaves the phone home will be parallel to the occasional memory lapse or intoxication that 
prevents someone who knows the number by heart from accessing the information. If we think that 
such occasional lapses are compatible with knowledge, then the smart phone holder's case won't be 
more problematic than the case of someone who know the number by heart. 
However, the cases of the lawyer and the person at the information desk are different: they 
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do not carry the devices that store the information with them all the time. A plausible modification 
of the original conditions would be to require access to the information only in the specific 
circumstances in which knowledge is needed. The lawyer and the person at the desk both figure as 
knowers in a kind of institutional setting, in their official capacity as sources of certain information. 
So perhaps it is sufficient if they have access to the information only when they are serving in this 
capacity. Another question concerns the fourth conditions mentioned in the original Otto case: the 
requirement of conscious endorsement in the past. The lawyer satisfies this condition, but the 
person at the information desk may not. The question is whether this requirement can also be 
relaxed in a certain direction. 
The best candidates for real-life knowledge-wh are cases of knowledge based on access to 
some sort of regimented data-base with a uniform nature or structure. The phone numbers in my 
phone, the dates of the completion of contracts and the location of shops in the mall arguably 
exhibit such a structure. What is no doubt very important for knowledge-wh through access to 
information is that the subject has a proper understanding of the nature of the information, once 
accessed, and also a proper understanding of how the information answers the question in the wh-
claus. It is relatively easy to satisfy these conditions with respect to regimented data-bases. 
9.   Knowing the answer and knowing how to find the answer
I now turn to an objection that may have occurred to the reader already. According to this objection,
Otto doesn't know where MoMA is, and B doesn't know what Pierre's phone number is; they merely
know how to find out the answer to certain questions, or know that they find the answer in a certain 
place. It could even be knowledge-wh, but a different one: Otto may know where he can find 
information concerning the whereabouts of MoMA, but not where MoMA is. These possible 
knowledge attributions explain the positive epistemic features we can attribute to Otto and B, 
because there is some knowledge here – but it's not the specific knowledge-wh that was defended in
the previous sections, according to the objection.
The problem with this proposal that the conditions that allegedly explain the positive 
epistemic features seem to be too weak. There are many cases where we know how to find out the 
answer to a question, or we know that a certain method is suitable for finding out the answer, and 
yet there is not even a remote temptation to attribute know-wh. For example, I know that by looking
up my comprehensive world history volume I will find the answer to many historical questions, that
other questions can be answered by consulting dictionaries or appropriate internet resources, 
interviewing people, checking the opening times on the sign on the door of the supermarket on the 
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corner, and so on. But that doesn't mean I know who succeeded Bela IV on the Hungarian throne, 
what “tulip” is in Spanish, where my brother was this morning, when the supermarket closes 
tonight, and so on. The same distinction can be made in our earlier examples. In the first scenario, A
probably knows that she can find out Pierre's phone number by asking B, yet she denies knowing 
what the phone-number is. In the last scenario, F knows how to find out the answer to E's questions:
she knows that asking the information desk will reveal where the dry cleaner is. Yet she denies 
knowing where the dry cleaner is. 
 This suggest that we cannot simply treat the above cases as people knowing how to find out
answers to questions, or knowing a relevant fact about the whereabouts of the relevant information: 
their epistemic position appears to be stronger than that. As I already mentioned, the ability to 
answer questions seems to be intimately related to knowledge-wh. A first shot at analysing 
knowledge-wh is naturally formulated in terms of knowing answers. For example, Jason Stanley 
suggests that initial reflection on the intuitive meaning of know-wh attributions results in the 
following: “Hannah knows why Obama won” “seems true if and only if Hannah knows the answer 
to the question, 'Why did Obama win?'” (Stanley 2010, p. 161). But this initial observation needs 
further work (supplied in great detail for example in Stanley's book). Knowing the answer is the 
same as knowing what the answer is, so we have another wh-attribution in need of analysis. Yet I 
mention this locution, because I want to point out that there is a difference between knowing the 
answer (or knowing what the answer is) on the one hand, and knowing how to find the answer on 
the other. 
I don't think this is controversial, and I expect that a defender of the traditional analysis will 
agree with this distinction, and also agree that the first is sufficient for know-wh, the second isn't. 
We both think that simply knowing  of an effective method of coming to know an answer to a 
question is not sufficient for know-wh. It is a condition that is fairly easy to satisfy, as the above 
examples to show: there are a vast number of questions I know how to find the answer to. But there 
are a lot fewer questions that I can answer on the basis of having easy, readily available access to 
information which is automatically endorsed by me upon retrieval, and which was produced and 
stored through a reliable entry-forming process that is integrated with my cognitive character. I 
propose that these latter cases are sufficient to grant an attribution of knowledge. 
Let me illustrate this difference with a further example. I have been having what looks like a
bad case of cold for a few days. What medication should I take? I know how to find out the answer: 
I ask my doctor, he will know. I go and see the doctor, he asks about my symptoms, and thinks that 
a new kind of antibiotics will just do the trick. He has a book with the names of all medications 
currently dispensed in the pharmacies; he looks up the name, writes the prescription. He has 
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displayed a significant amount of expertise and knowledge during this process, much more than I 
did, even though we both knew how to find out the answer to a question. More specifically, I 
suggest, my doctor knew what medication I should take (even though he doesn't know the name by 
heart).
10. Changing knowledge
I see the current proposal as a response to certain – especially technological – developments 
concerning our use of, and access to, information. Electronic information storage, efficient search 
methods and reliable access to the internet can change the way we relate to knowledge production, 
knowledge transfer and the assessment of knowledge. It seems that we need to store less and less in 
our head in order to acquire expertise in a certain field. 
In discussions about the effect that the growing use of computers and the internet has on 
human thinking, people often quote a passage from Plato's Phaedrus, where Socrates, through the 
words of the Egyptian king Thamus, explains the damaging effects of learning to write:
it will introduce forgetfulness into the soul of those who learn it: they will not practice using 
their memory because they will put their trust in writing, which is external and depends on 
signs that belong to others, instead of trying to remember from the inside, completely on 
their own. You have not discovered a potion for remembering, but for reminding; you 
provide your students with the appearance of wisdom, not with its reality. Your invention 
will enable them to hear many things without being properly taught, and they will imagine 
that they have come to know much while for the most part they will know nothing. (Plato, 
Phaedrus, 275a-b, pp. 551-552)
In hindsight this may appear somewhat shortsighted, given the extent to which the development of 
science, culture and technology relied essentially on the written symbol. We recognise that people 
can “come to know much” even if they trust signs that belong to others “instead of trying to 
remember from the inside, completely on their own”.  I propose that the same is true of trusting 
smartphones for phone numbers. I am not advocating the thesis that the introduction of writing or 
digital computers somehow changes the inner mechanism of cognition (although that may be true 
too). But I am suggesting that we should rethink again how much “remembering from the inside” is 
required for knowledge. The case of the doctor above is a good example. There is no need for a 
general practitioner to keep in mind the ever changing brand names of all medications. If he can 
quickly and reliably find the appropriate names in the book (something which I certainly cannot 
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do), then this should be good enough for us counting him as knowing the names.
Knowledge is produced and transferred in the context of a community of people who need 
knowledge themselves and need knowledgable individuals to help them in various matters of life. 
My proposal is that in the current context, where we have easy and reliable access to data-bases, we 
should factor this in our calculations about who has knowledge. Know-wh attributions, unlike 
know-that attributions, do not include a known proposition in their content. This enables us to do 
various things: we can attribute knowledge over a changing  subject-matter, we can attribute 
knowledge to people more knowledgeable than ourselves, and, I want to propose further, we can 
attribute knowledge to ourselves, even if the proposition is not explicitly represented. 
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1  Elsewhere (Farkas 2015) I argued that this may be a case of knowledge without belief, by 
pointing out that a number of objections against attributing beliefs to Otto will not work against 
attributing him knowledge, and by making a prima facie case for treating Otto as a knower (without 
addressing the issue whether this is know-that or know-wh). This section draws on the discussion in
Farkas 2015.
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